宿命論
宿命論
古月語 19.01.13 10:40
資料摘自自由的百科全書
宿命論指人生中早已註定的遭遇，包括生死禍福、貧富貴賤等或者相信一切事情都是由人無法控制的力量所促成的。[1]相信宿命論的人認為人間發生的每一件事都是註定的，由上帝或上天預先安排，人無法改變。
宿命論的觀念十分普遍。不論古今中外，人們都不斷嘗試解開人生的種種奧秘，或找出某些事情的寓意。歷史家黑爾默·林格倫説：「視乎人把事情看成是由某種力量促成，順理成章地發生，還是純粹出於偶然，然後人就把「神」、「命運」或「機遇」加諸其上。」在人類的歷史上，跟命運有關的信仰、傳説和神話常常俯拾即是。
亞述學家讓·博泰羅説：「現代文化的各方面，都深受美索不達米亞的文化所影響。」他也説，在古代的美索不達米亞或巴比倫，人們可找着「人類最早期對超自然事物的反應和看法，以及可辨別的最古老的宗教架構」。命運的觀念也同樣源於這個地方。
起源及發展
在現時的伊拉克美索不達米亞的遺跡中，考古學家發現迄今已知一些最古老的寫作。成千上萬塊刻上楔形文字的泥板構成了一幅鮮明的圖畫，使古代著名城市巴比倫的蘇美爾人和阿卡得人的生活文化得以活現眼前。據考古學家塞繆爾·克拉默説，蘇美爾人「由於人間疾苦，尤其是一些成因令人費解的事情，而深感苦惱」。他們渴望找着圓滿的解釋，於是命運的觀念就應運而生了。
古巴比倫
考古學家瓊·奧茨在著作[2]中説：「在巴比倫，人人都有自己的神或女神。」巴比倫人相信，「個別的人也好，群體也好，命運通通都操縱在諸神的手裏」。克拉默説，蘇美爾人相信「掌管宇宙的神把邪惡、欺騙和暴力註定為生活的主要部分」。宿命的觀念給廣傳開去，而且深深受人尊重。
巴比倫人相信，占卜是「跟神溝通的一種方法」，通過占卜人就能知道神的旨意。占卜包括：藉着觀察事情來預告未來、解釋深奧事情的因由和説明事情隱含的意思。夢境、動物的行為和內臟是用來占卜的典型事物。[3]一些給説成是預告未來出乎意料或不尋常的事情，一律記錄在泥板上。
研究古代文化的法國學者愛德華·多爾姆説：「占卜者和占卜的觀念可追溯到美索不達米亞的文化。」求神問卜是他們生活上一個顯著的特色。事實上，博泰羅教授也説：「任何事物都可以用來占卜。……經過仔細研究後，整個物質宇宙都可以被視為能夠或多或少預示人的未來。」美索不達米亞人渴望預知自己的將來，因此對占星術十分熱衷。[4]
此外，巴比倫人也用骰子或籤來占卜。德博拉·貝內特在著作[5]中説，這樣就可以「剔除人為因素，使諸神能更明確地啟露旨意」。不過，他們卻不認為神的旨意是無可變更的；只要向神懇求開恩，人就可以逃過厄運。
古埃及
公元前15世紀，埃及人和巴比倫人往來密切。他們在文化方面互相影響，結果跟命運有關的信仰就傳到埃及去了。為甚麼埃及人會接納這種觀念呢？牛津大學埃及學教授約翰·貝恩斯説：「在（埃及人）的宗教信仰裏，大部分都跟探知和回應不能預測或不幸的事情有關。」
伊希斯是埃及神祇之一。這個神被描述為「生命的女神，命運的主宰」。埃及人同樣熱中於占卜和占星術。[6]一個歷史學家説：「埃及人求神問卜的方法五花八門、層出不窮。」然而，受巴比倫篤信命運之風影響的國家還不只埃及一個。
希臘與羅馬
讓·博泰羅説，在宗教理念方面，「巴比倫的影響力無遠弗屆，古代的希臘也抗拒不了」。論到宿命論在希臘人當中十分流行，彼得·格林教授有以下一番解釋：「世事變幻莫測，人也越來越害怕為所作的決定負責。事實上，希臘人覺得自己好像傀儡一樣，給註定的命運牽制着，未來根本早就預定好了。人是無法掙脫命運的枷鎖的；它是神的決定，人是沒法理解的。不過，人要是具備特殊技能或知識，就可以預知自己的命運。儘管預告的不一定順耳，但不少人覺得，預先知道多少總可以做點防範工夫。」
命運之説令人對未來稍稍安心之餘，也間接成為某些人利用的污穢手段。歷史家桑德貝克説：「世界是由一個神統治的説法，相當受統治階層歡迎。」原因是因為相信命運的百姓都會臣服君主，不易起謀反之意。
格林教授進一步解釋説：「相信命運使人尊重社會和政治的固有秩序，使人在道德、宗教和説話方面可以自我審查。希臘統治階層鼓吹宿命論，手段既高明又詭詐。百姓安於天命，他們的領導地位就穩如泰山，長存不變。相信命運的人會覺得，任何事情都是註定要發生的；上蒼為人着想，所以發生在人身上的事都是出於上蒼一番好意。」事實上，這不過「證明統治者們的私心」罷了。
宿命論在希臘的普遍程度，從希臘的文學作品可見一斑。在古代的寫作風格中，命運常常是史詩、傳説和悲劇的主要元素。希臘也流傳着一個神話，説人的命運操縱在命運三女神的手裏：克洛托紡織生命之紗，拉凱西斯決定人壽命的長度，當指定時間一到，阿塔羅波斯就大剪一揮，了結人的生命。羅馬人也崇拜類似的三合一命運之神。
羅馬人跟希臘人一樣，對自己的命運求索心切，因此都從巴比倫引入了占卜和占星術，還進一步加以發展。羅馬人把用來預測未來的事情稱為兆頭（portena），而兆頭預告的信息就稱為奧敏那（omina）。到了公元前3世紀，占星術成了希臘人當中流行的玩意兒。公元前62年，迄今已知最早期的希臘天宮圖也問世了。吉爾伯特·默里教授説，占星術「對古希臘人所生的影響，就像一種新疫症在某個荒蕪小島上擴散起來」，可見希臘人對占星術是十分地沉迷。
希臘人和羅馬人也認為諸神通過靈媒跟人溝通，因此在窺探未來時，他們也不時向靈媒求助。[7]這些見解導致甚麼結果呢？哲學家伯特蘭·羅素説：「恐懼取代了希望。人們窮一生的精力要掙脫厄運，而不再為美好的將來奮鬥。」後來，跟命運有關的信仰也成了一般基督教會爭議的課題。
基督教
宿命論在「基督徒」當中曾經引起廣泛的爭辯。
在古希臘和羅馬，人們相信命運已蔚然成風，早期的基督徒就生活在深受這種文化影響的環境裏。舉個例，所謂的教父十分倚重希臘哲學家亞里士多德和柏拉圖等的著作。他們想弄清楚一個問題：既然上帝無所不知、無所不能、可以「從起初指明末後的事」，他當然早就知道人會墮落犯罪，以及隨之而來的種種悲慘後果，這樣，他又怎算是個滿有愛心的上帝呢？[8]
多産的早期基督教作家奧利金辯稱，人應該記住一個重要因素：人是擁有自由意志的。奧利金寫道：「事實上，聖經裏有多不勝數的經文，毫不含糊地確立人有自由意志這麼一回事。」
奧利金説，人得對自己的行為負責。把事情怪在某種外在力量上是「不正確、不恰當的。這樣説的人旨在摒除人有自由意志的觀念罷了」。奧利金也説，上帝能預知事態發展，跟上帝註定事情發生或覺得要操縱事情，不該給混為一談。可惜的是，並不是人人都認同這個見解。
深具影響力的教父奧古斯丁（公元354年──430年）認為，在決定事情方面，自由意志其實無足輕重。他這番話使爭論變得更加複雜。宿命論得以在一般基督教會裏奠基，全是拜奧古斯丁所賜。他的著作[9]成了中世紀人們討論的中心課題。在宗教改革運動期間，一般基督教會就命運所作的爭辯更趨白熱化，令各教會因為意見不一而産生嚴重分歧。
傳播
命運的觀念還不僅限於西方社會。每逢災禍發生，伊斯蘭教徒都會説「梅克蒂」，意思是「這是天意」，反映出他們同樣篤信命運。誠然，不少東方宗教都主張人能主宰自己的命運，但教義多少都帶有宿命論的成分。
例如，印度教徒和佛教徒都相信業，也就是人今生的功過會決定他來生的命運，是逃避也逃避不來的。中國最早期的文字──甲骨文是刻在龜甲上的，而龜甲是可以用來占卜的。另外，宿命論也是美洲原住民信仰的一部分。舉個例，阿茲特克人就制訂出占卜曆書，好讓人查看自己的命運。即使遠至非洲，宿命論也十分普遍。
其實，這麼多人接受命運的觀念，不過表明人有個基本需要，就是得信靠一股高強的力量。約翰·諾斯在《人類的宗教》[10]裏寫道：「宗教都有個共同點，就是説人不是也不能獨自生存。人跟大自然和他外在的社會息息相關，甚至得依賴它們才可以繼續活下去。人或多或少都意識到，人是無法遺世獨立、不假外求的。」
參考資料
[1] The World Book Encyclopedia，「fatalism」條目
[2]《Babylon》，Joan Oates
[3]《聖經‧舊約‧以西結書》21章21節和但以理書2章1-4節相關的記載。
[4] 《聖經‧舊約‧以賽亞書》47章13節的相關記載。
[5]Randomness，Deborah Bennett著，英文
[6]《聖經‧舊約‧以賽亞書》19章3節對占星術和占卜的論述
[7]《聖經》使徒行傳16章16-19節對希臘人的記載
[8]《聖經‧舊約‧以賽亞書》46章10界和聖經新約約翰一書4章8節
[9]奧古斯丁的主要著作是《自由意志》
[10] John B. Noss：《Man』s Religions》
Fatalismis a philosophical doctrine emphasizing the subjugation of all events or actions to fate.
Fatalism generally refers to any of the following ideas:
Determinism, fatalism and predeterminism
While the terms are often used interchangeably, fatalism, determinism, and predeterminism are discrete in emphasizing different aspects of the futility of human will or the foreordination of destiny. However, all these doctrines share common ground.
Determinists generally agree that human actions affect the future but that human action is itself determined by a causal chain of prior events. Their view does not accentuate a "submission" to fate or destiny, whereas fatalists stress an acceptance of future events as inevitable. Determinists believe the future is fixed specifically due to causality; fatalists and predeterminists believe that some or all aspects of the future are inescapable, but not necessarily due to causality.
Fatalism is a looser term than determinism. The presence of historical "indeterminisms" or chances, i.e. events that could not be predicted by sole knowledge of other events, is any idea still compatible with fatalism. Necessity (such as a law of nature) will happen just as inevitably as a chance—both can be imagined as sovereign.
Likewise, determinism is a broader term than predeterminism. Predeterminists, as a specific type of determinists, believe that every single event or effect is caused by an uninterrupted chain of events that goes back to the origin of the universe. Determinists, holding a more generic view, meanwhile, believe that each event is at least caused by recent prior events, if not also by such far-extending and unbroken events as those going back in time to the universe's very origins.
Both fatalism and predeterminism, by referring to the personal "fate" or to "predetermined events" strongly imply the existence of a someone or something that has done the "predetermining." This is usually interpreted to mean a conscious, omniscient being or force who has personally planned—and therefore knows at all times—the exact succession of every event in the past, present, and future, none of which can be altered. One of the most famous theological interpretations of this idea is the Calvinist Christian notion of predestination, in which all occurring events have been already willed at the beginning of the universe by God. Contrarily, determinism does not usually imply the existence of such a supernatural being; many determinist models fall under scientific rather than religious or mystical philosophies.
The Idle Argument
One famous ancient argument regarding fatalism was the so-called Idle Argument. It argues that if something is fated, then it would be pointless or futile to make any effort to bring it about. The Idle Argument was described by Origen and Cicero and it went like this:
The Idle Argument was anticipated by Aristotle in his De Interpretatione chapter 9. The Stoics considered it to be a sophism and the Stoic Chrysippus attempted to refute it by pointing out that consulting the doctor would be as much fated as recovering. He seems to have introduced the idea that in cases like that at issue two events can be co-fated, so that one cannot occur without the other.[6] It is, however, a false argument because it fails to consider that those fated to recover may be those fated to consult a doctor.
Logical Fatalism and the Argument from Bivalence
Another famous argument for fatalism that goes back to antiquity is one that depends not on causation or physical circumstances but rather is based on presumed logical truths. There are numerous versions of this argument, including those by Aristotle[7] and Richard Taylor.[2] These have been objected to and elaborated on[1]but do not enjoy mainstream support.[citation needed]
The key idea of logical fatalism is that there is a body of true propositions (statements) about what is going to happen, and these are true regardless of when they are made. So, for example, if it is true today that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, then there cannot fail to be a sea battle tomorrow, since otherwise it would not be true today that such a battle will take place tomorrow.
The argument relies heavily on the principle of bivalence: the idea that any proposition is either true or false. As a result of this principle, if it is not false that there will be a sea battle, then it is true; there is no in-between. However, rejecting the principle of bivalence—perhaps by saying that the truth of a proposition regarding the future is indeterminate—is a controversial view since the principle is an accepted part of classical logic.
Another criticism of logical fatalism is that it assumes a timeless set of all propositions which exist without being proposed by anyone in particular. Constructivists (a school of thought in logic and mathematics) argue that this is not the case and that propositions only exist when they are constructed or expressed.
Criticisms
In addition to the criticism levelled at the arguments put forward for fatalism, another criticism of fatalism in general is its assumption that truths do not conflict with each other. Twentieth century developments in theoretical and experimental quantum physics, specifically the concept of complementarity, seem to show that there exist pairs of statements, only one of which can be true at any given time. For example, Heisenberg's Principle of Uncertainty theorises that if it is true that a subatomic particle will be measured to have a well-defined position, then it is not true that the particle will be measured to have a well-defined momentum and vice versa. In other words, a maximum of one of the two statements 'has a well-defined position' and 'has a well-defined momentum' can be true of a given subatomic particle at a given time.[citation needed]
Another noteworthy criticism comes from the novelist David Foster Wallace, who in a 1985 paper "Richard Taylor's Fatalism and the Semantics of Physical Modality" suggests that Taylor reached his conclusion of fatalism only because his argument involved two different and inconsistent notions of impossibility.[8] Wallace did not reject fatalism per se, as he wrote in his closing passage, "if Taylor and the fatalists want to force upon us a metaphysical conclusion, they must do metaphysics, not semantics. And this seems entirely appropriate."[8] Willem deVries and Jay Garfield, both of whom were advisers on Wallace’s thesis, expressed regret that Wallace never published his argument.[8] In 2010, the thesis was, however, published posthumously as Time, Fate, and Language: An Essay on Free Will.
If the quantum physical rules apply universally, then the above-described complementarity constitutes experimental disproof of fatalism. It would therefore be of merely historical interest. If, on the other hand, the quantum physical formalisms apply only in restricted domains, then fatalism could be retained by restricting it to those domains in which the quantum formalism is inapplicable. One pure fatalist argument, is that the seeming random movement of quantum physics is not random at all. Instead, each movement is predetermined in a seemingly random pattern, but is actually a predetermined pattern. This belief is the pure fatalist counter to the quantum physics argument
Notes
[1] a b Hugh Rice (October 11, 2010). "Fatalism". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fatalism/. Retrieved December 2, 2010.
[2] [a b] Richard Taylor (January 1962). "Fatalism". The Philosophical Review (Duke University Press) 71 (1): 56–66. JSTOR 2183681.
[3] Catholic Encyclopedia
[4] Origen Contra Celsum II 20
[5]Cicero De Fato 28-9
[6]Susanne Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, Oxford 1998, chapter 5
[7] Aristotle, De Interpretatione, 9
[8]a b c Ryerson, James (December 12, 2008). "Consider the Philosopher". The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/14/magazine/14wwln-Wallace-t.html.
宿命論指人生中早已註定的遭遇，包括生死禍福、貧富貴賤等或者相信一切事情都是由人無法控制的力量所促成的。[1]相信宿命論的人認為人間發生的每一件事都是註定的，由上帝或上天預先安排，人無法改變。
宿命論的觀念十分普遍。不論古今中外，人們都不斷嘗試解開人生的種種奧秘，或找出某些事情的寓意。歷史家黑爾默·林格倫説：「視乎人把事情看成是由某種力量促成，順理成章地發生，還是純粹出於偶然，然後人就把「神」、「命運」或「機遇」加諸其上。」在人類的歷史上，跟命運有關的信仰、傳説和神話常常俯拾即是。
亞述學家讓·博泰羅説：「現代文化的各方面，都深受美索不達米亞的文化所影響。」他也説，在古代的美索不達米亞或巴比倫，人們可找着「人類最早期對超自然事物的反應和看法，以及可辨別的最古老的宗教架構」。命運的觀念也同樣源於這個地方。
起源及發展
在現時的伊拉克美索不達米亞的遺跡中，考古學家發現迄今已知一些最古老的寫作。成千上萬塊刻上楔形文字的泥板構成了一幅鮮明的圖畫，使古代著名城市巴比倫的蘇美爾人和阿卡得人的生活文化得以活現眼前。據考古學家塞繆爾·克拉默説，蘇美爾人「由於人間疾苦，尤其是一些成因令人費解的事情，而深感苦惱」。他們渴望找着圓滿的解釋，於是命運的觀念就應運而生了。
古巴比倫
考古學家瓊·奧茨在著作[2]中説：「在巴比倫，人人都有自己的神或女神。」巴比倫人相信，「個別的人也好，群體也好，命運通通都操縱在諸神的手裏」。克拉默説，蘇美爾人相信「掌管宇宙的神把邪惡、欺騙和暴力註定為生活的主要部分」。宿命的觀念給廣傳開去，而且深深受人尊重。
巴比倫人相信，占卜是「跟神溝通的一種方法」，通過占卜人就能知道神的旨意。占卜包括：藉着觀察事情來預告未來、解釋深奧事情的因由和説明事情隱含的意思。夢境、動物的行為和內臟是用來占卜的典型事物。[3]一些給説成是預告未來出乎意料或不尋常的事情，一律記錄在泥板上。
研究古代文化的法國學者愛德華·多爾姆説：「占卜者和占卜的觀念可追溯到美索不達米亞的文化。」求神問卜是他們生活上一個顯著的特色。事實上，博泰羅教授也説：「任何事物都可以用來占卜。……經過仔細研究後，整個物質宇宙都可以被視為能夠或多或少預示人的未來。」美索不達米亞人渴望預知自己的將來，因此對占星術十分熱衷。[4]
此外，巴比倫人也用骰子或籤來占卜。德博拉·貝內特在著作[5]中説，這樣就可以「剔除人為因素，使諸神能更明確地啟露旨意」。不過，他們卻不認為神的旨意是無可變更的；只要向神懇求開恩，人就可以逃過厄運。
古埃及
公元前15世紀，埃及人和巴比倫人往來密切。他們在文化方面互相影響，結果跟命運有關的信仰就傳到埃及去了。為甚麼埃及人會接納這種觀念呢？牛津大學埃及學教授約翰·貝恩斯説：「在（埃及人）的宗教信仰裏，大部分都跟探知和回應不能預測或不幸的事情有關。」
伊希斯是埃及神祇之一。這個神被描述為「生命的女神，命運的主宰」。埃及人同樣熱中於占卜和占星術。[6]一個歷史學家説：「埃及人求神問卜的方法五花八門、層出不窮。」然而，受巴比倫篤信命運之風影響的國家還不只埃及一個。
希臘與羅馬
讓·博泰羅説，在宗教理念方面，「巴比倫的影響力無遠弗屆，古代的希臘也抗拒不了」。論到宿命論在希臘人當中十分流行，彼得·格林教授有以下一番解釋：「世事變幻莫測，人也越來越害怕為所作的決定負責。事實上，希臘人覺得自己好像傀儡一樣，給註定的命運牽制着，未來根本早就預定好了。人是無法掙脫命運的枷鎖的；它是神的決定，人是沒法理解的。不過，人要是具備特殊技能或知識，就可以預知自己的命運。儘管預告的不一定順耳，但不少人覺得，預先知道多少總可以做點防範工夫。」
命運之説令人對未來稍稍安心之餘，也間接成為某些人利用的污穢手段。歷史家桑德貝克説：「世界是由一個神統治的説法，相當受統治階層歡迎。」原因是因為相信命運的百姓都會臣服君主，不易起謀反之意。
格林教授進一步解釋説：「相信命運使人尊重社會和政治的固有秩序，使人在道德、宗教和説話方面可以自我審查。希臘統治階層鼓吹宿命論，手段既高明又詭詐。百姓安於天命，他們的領導地位就穩如泰山，長存不變。相信命運的人會覺得，任何事情都是註定要發生的；上蒼為人着想，所以發生在人身上的事都是出於上蒼一番好意。」事實上，這不過「證明統治者們的私心」罷了。
宿命論在希臘的普遍程度，從希臘的文學作品可見一斑。在古代的寫作風格中，命運常常是史詩、傳説和悲劇的主要元素。希臘也流傳着一個神話，説人的命運操縱在命運三女神的手裏：克洛托紡織生命之紗，拉凱西斯決定人壽命的長度，當指定時間一到，阿塔羅波斯就大剪一揮，了結人的生命。羅馬人也崇拜類似的三合一命運之神。
羅馬人跟希臘人一樣，對自己的命運求索心切，因此都從巴比倫引入了占卜和占星術，還進一步加以發展。羅馬人把用來預測未來的事情稱為兆頭（portena），而兆頭預告的信息就稱為奧敏那（omina）。到了公元前3世紀，占星術成了希臘人當中流行的玩意兒。公元前62年，迄今已知最早期的希臘天宮圖也問世了。吉爾伯特·默里教授説，占星術「對古希臘人所生的影響，就像一種新疫症在某個荒蕪小島上擴散起來」，可見希臘人對占星術是十分地沉迷。
希臘人和羅馬人也認為諸神通過靈媒跟人溝通，因此在窺探未來時，他們也不時向靈媒求助。[7]這些見解導致甚麼結果呢？哲學家伯特蘭·羅素説：「恐懼取代了希望。人們窮一生的精力要掙脫厄運，而不再為美好的將來奮鬥。」後來，跟命運有關的信仰也成了一般基督教會爭議的課題。
基督教
宿命論在「基督徒」當中曾經引起廣泛的爭辯。
在古希臘和羅馬，人們相信命運已蔚然成風，早期的基督徒就生活在深受這種文化影響的環境裏。舉個例，所謂的教父十分倚重希臘哲學家亞里士多德和柏拉圖等的著作。他們想弄清楚一個問題：既然上帝無所不知、無所不能、可以「從起初指明末後的事」，他當然早就知道人會墮落犯罪，以及隨之而來的種種悲慘後果，這樣，他又怎算是個滿有愛心的上帝呢？[8]
多産的早期基督教作家奧利金辯稱，人應該記住一個重要因素：人是擁有自由意志的。奧利金寫道：「事實上，聖經裏有多不勝數的經文，毫不含糊地確立人有自由意志這麼一回事。」
奧利金説，人得對自己的行為負責。把事情怪在某種外在力量上是「不正確、不恰當的。這樣説的人旨在摒除人有自由意志的觀念罷了」。奧利金也説，上帝能預知事態發展，跟上帝註定事情發生或覺得要操縱事情，不該給混為一談。可惜的是，並不是人人都認同這個見解。
深具影響力的教父奧古斯丁（公元354年──430年）認為，在決定事情方面，自由意志其實無足輕重。他這番話使爭論變得更加複雜。宿命論得以在一般基督教會裏奠基，全是拜奧古斯丁所賜。他的著作[9]成了中世紀人們討論的中心課題。在宗教改革運動期間，一般基督教會就命運所作的爭辯更趨白熱化，令各教會因為意見不一而産生嚴重分歧。
傳播
命運的觀念還不僅限於西方社會。每逢災禍發生，伊斯蘭教徒都會説「梅克蒂」，意思是「這是天意」，反映出他們同樣篤信命運。誠然，不少東方宗教都主張人能主宰自己的命運，但教義多少都帶有宿命論的成分。
例如，印度教徒和佛教徒都相信業，也就是人今生的功過會決定他來生的命運，是逃避也逃避不來的。中國最早期的文字──甲骨文是刻在龜甲上的，而龜甲是可以用來占卜的。另外，宿命論也是美洲原住民信仰的一部分。舉個例，阿茲特克人就制訂出占卜曆書，好讓人查看自己的命運。即使遠至非洲，宿命論也十分普遍。
其實，這麼多人接受命運的觀念，不過表明人有個基本需要，就是得信靠一股高強的力量。約翰·諾斯在《人類的宗教》[10]裏寫道：「宗教都有個共同點，就是説人不是也不能獨自生存。人跟大自然和他外在的社會息息相關，甚至得依賴它們才可以繼續活下去。人或多或少都意識到，人是無法遺世獨立、不假外求的。」
參考資料
[1] The World Book Encyclopedia，「fatalism」條目
[2]《Babylon》，Joan Oates
[3]《聖經‧舊約‧以西結書》21章21節和但以理書2章1-4節相關的記載。
[4] 《聖經‧舊約‧以賽亞書》47章13節的相關記載。
[5]Randomness，Deborah Bennett著，英文
[6]《聖經‧舊約‧以賽亞書》19章3節對占星術和占卜的論述
[7]《聖經》使徒行傳16章16-19節對希臘人的記載
[8]《聖經‧舊約‧以賽亞書》46章10界和聖經新約約翰一書4章8節
[9]奧古斯丁的主要著作是《自由意志》
[10] John B. Noss：《Man』s Religions》
Fatalismis a philosophical doctrine emphasizing the subjugation of all events or actions to fate.
Fatalism generally refers to any of the following ideas:
| 1. | The view that we are powerless to do anything other than what we actually do.[1] Included in this is that man has no power to influence the future, or indeed, his own actions.[2]This belief is very similar to predeterminism. |
| 2. | An attitude of resignation in the face of some future event or events which are thought to be inevitable[citation needed] |
| 3. | That actions are free, but nevertheless work toward an inevitable end.[3] This belief is very similar to compatibilist predestination. |
| 4. | That acceptance is appropriate, rather than resistance against inevitability. This belief is very similar to defeatism. |
While the terms are often used interchangeably, fatalism, determinism, and predeterminism are discrete in emphasizing different aspects of the futility of human will or the foreordination of destiny. However, all these doctrines share common ground.
Determinists generally agree that human actions affect the future but that human action is itself determined by a causal chain of prior events. Their view does not accentuate a "submission" to fate or destiny, whereas fatalists stress an acceptance of future events as inevitable. Determinists believe the future is fixed specifically due to causality; fatalists and predeterminists believe that some or all aspects of the future are inescapable, but not necessarily due to causality.
Fatalism is a looser term than determinism. The presence of historical "indeterminisms" or chances, i.e. events that could not be predicted by sole knowledge of other events, is any idea still compatible with fatalism. Necessity (such as a law of nature) will happen just as inevitably as a chance—both can be imagined as sovereign.
Likewise, determinism is a broader term than predeterminism. Predeterminists, as a specific type of determinists, believe that every single event or effect is caused by an uninterrupted chain of events that goes back to the origin of the universe. Determinists, holding a more generic view, meanwhile, believe that each event is at least caused by recent prior events, if not also by such far-extending and unbroken events as those going back in time to the universe's very origins.
Both fatalism and predeterminism, by referring to the personal "fate" or to "predetermined events" strongly imply the existence of a someone or something that has done the "predetermining." This is usually interpreted to mean a conscious, omniscient being or force who has personally planned—and therefore knows at all times—the exact succession of every event in the past, present, and future, none of which can be altered. One of the most famous theological interpretations of this idea is the Calvinist Christian notion of predestination, in which all occurring events have been already willed at the beginning of the universe by God. Contrarily, determinism does not usually imply the existence of such a supernatural being; many determinist models fall under scientific rather than religious or mystical philosophies.
The Idle Argument
One famous ancient argument regarding fatalism was the so-called Idle Argument. It argues that if something is fated, then it would be pointless or futile to make any effort to bring it about. The Idle Argument was described by Origen and Cicero and it went like this:
| ● | If it is fated for you to recover from this illness, then you will recover whether you call a doctor or not. |
| ● | Likewise, if you are fated not to recover, you will not do so whether you call a doctor or not. |
| ● | But either it is fated that you will recover from this illness, or it is fated that you will not recover. |
| ● | Therefore it is futile to consult a doctor.[4][5] |
The Idle Argument was anticipated by Aristotle in his De Interpretatione chapter 9. The Stoics considered it to be a sophism and the Stoic Chrysippus attempted to refute it by pointing out that consulting the doctor would be as much fated as recovering. He seems to have introduced the idea that in cases like that at issue two events can be co-fated, so that one cannot occur without the other.[6] It is, however, a false argument because it fails to consider that those fated to recover may be those fated to consult a doctor.
Logical Fatalism and the Argument from Bivalence
Another famous argument for fatalism that goes back to antiquity is one that depends not on causation or physical circumstances but rather is based on presumed logical truths. There are numerous versions of this argument, including those by Aristotle[7] and Richard Taylor.[2] These have been objected to and elaborated on[1]but do not enjoy mainstream support.[citation needed]
The key idea of logical fatalism is that there is a body of true propositions (statements) about what is going to happen, and these are true regardless of when they are made. So, for example, if it is true today that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, then there cannot fail to be a sea battle tomorrow, since otherwise it would not be true today that such a battle will take place tomorrow.
The argument relies heavily on the principle of bivalence: the idea that any proposition is either true or false. As a result of this principle, if it is not false that there will be a sea battle, then it is true; there is no in-between. However, rejecting the principle of bivalence—perhaps by saying that the truth of a proposition regarding the future is indeterminate—is a controversial view since the principle is an accepted part of classical logic.
Another criticism of logical fatalism is that it assumes a timeless set of all propositions which exist without being proposed by anyone in particular. Constructivists (a school of thought in logic and mathematics) argue that this is not the case and that propositions only exist when they are constructed or expressed.
Criticisms
In addition to the criticism levelled at the arguments put forward for fatalism, another criticism of fatalism in general is its assumption that truths do not conflict with each other. Twentieth century developments in theoretical and experimental quantum physics, specifically the concept of complementarity, seem to show that there exist pairs of statements, only one of which can be true at any given time. For example, Heisenberg's Principle of Uncertainty theorises that if it is true that a subatomic particle will be measured to have a well-defined position, then it is not true that the particle will be measured to have a well-defined momentum and vice versa. In other words, a maximum of one of the two statements 'has a well-defined position' and 'has a well-defined momentum' can be true of a given subatomic particle at a given time.[citation needed]
Another noteworthy criticism comes from the novelist David Foster Wallace, who in a 1985 paper "Richard Taylor's Fatalism and the Semantics of Physical Modality" suggests that Taylor reached his conclusion of fatalism only because his argument involved two different and inconsistent notions of impossibility.[8] Wallace did not reject fatalism per se, as he wrote in his closing passage, "if Taylor and the fatalists want to force upon us a metaphysical conclusion, they must do metaphysics, not semantics. And this seems entirely appropriate."[8] Willem deVries and Jay Garfield, both of whom were advisers on Wallace’s thesis, expressed regret that Wallace never published his argument.[8] In 2010, the thesis was, however, published posthumously as Time, Fate, and Language: An Essay on Free Will.
If the quantum physical rules apply universally, then the above-described complementarity constitutes experimental disproof of fatalism. It would therefore be of merely historical interest. If, on the other hand, the quantum physical formalisms apply only in restricted domains, then fatalism could be retained by restricting it to those domains in which the quantum formalism is inapplicable. One pure fatalist argument, is that the seeming random movement of quantum physics is not random at all. Instead, each movement is predetermined in a seemingly random pattern, but is actually a predetermined pattern. This belief is the pure fatalist counter to the quantum physics argument
Notes
[1] a b Hugh Rice (October 11, 2010). "Fatalism". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fatalism/. Retrieved December 2, 2010.
[2] [a b] Richard Taylor (January 1962). "Fatalism". The Philosophical Review (Duke University Press) 71 (1): 56–66. JSTOR 2183681.
[3] Catholic Encyclopedia
[4] Origen Contra Celsum II 20
[5]Cicero De Fato 28-9
[6]Susanne Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, Oxford 1998, chapter 5
[7] Aristotle, De Interpretatione, 9
[8]a b c Ryerson, James (December 12, 2008). "Consider the Philosopher". The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/14/magazine/14wwln-Wallace-t.html.
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